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Are Noncompete Contracts Between
Physicians Bad Medicine?
Advocating in the Affirmative by Drawing a Public
Policy Parallel to the Legal Profession
Alina Klimkina'
INTRODUCTION
N August of 2008, the California Supreme Court broadly held noncompete
contracts per se invalid, even if narrowly tailored, unless necessary to
protect trade secrets! The restrictive agreement, signed by a CPA several
years prior to the suit, was found unlawful as against public policy.3 The
court stated that the value of an employee's mobility, the opportunity for
employment, and free and fair competition substantially outweighed the
value of enforcing the agreement between an employee and an employer.4
This California decision is a bold statement upholding "the values
of free competition and employee mobility."' The case recognizes
noncompete contracts under only a narrow exception, ultimately making
it much more difficult to create such restrictions on competition and
trade.6 Most significantly, in rejecting a long precedent of Ninth Circuit
I Bachelor of Arts in English and Philosophy, 2007, Centre College; Juris Doctor ex-
pected 2010, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor
Gaetke, whose invaluable insight inspired this Note. Also, the author wishes to thank her
husband and family for their support.
2 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 296 (Cal. zoo8); see CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 166O-i6602 (West 2oo8); see also CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 1997) (setting
forth the requirements for trade secrets); see e.g., Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic
Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. zd 573, 576-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr
2d 731, 734-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
3 ArthurAndersen, LLP, 189 P.3d at 291.
4 Id. at 291-92; see also Marie-Anne Hogarth, California Supreme Court Rules Against Non-
compete Agreements, SACRAMENTO Bus. J., Aug. 7, 2oo8, http://sacramento.bizjournals.com/sacra-
mento/stories/2oo8/o8/o4/daily48.html.
5 Dwight L.Armstrong, Joe M. Davidson & Keith Bishop, California SupremeCourtConflrms
Limited Enforceability of Non-Competition Agreements in California, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL (Sept.
20, 2oo8), http://www.martindale.com/members/ArticleBody.aspx?id=510598.
6 Id; see also Hogarth, supra note 4.
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cases, California places itself among a very few states to advocate against
restrictive covenants in employment without differentiating as to the
reasonableness of an agreement.7
"Historically, covenants not to compete were viewed as restraints of
trade and were invalid at common law."8  In time, "ancillary restraints,"
such as noncompetes signed incident to employment, were enforced
under "the rule of reason."9 The "war" between the employee's interests
in professional mobility and the employer's desire to protect his business
interests represents the "modern world of employee non-compete
agreements."'" Even more striking is the steady approval of, and judicial
assent to, restrictive covenants in some professions as opposed to the
traditional disapproval of such contracts in the legal profession. The medical
profession, where noncompetes have been upheld by most courts, if found
reasonable, provides the best example."
Against this backdrop, and in light of recent decisions, this Note
discusses the background and policy of traditional noncompete agreements,
the current trend of restrictive covenants, and most importantly, provides
a public policy comparison between the professional fields of medicine
and law in which the enforcement of noncompetes is strikingly different.
Specifically, this Note presents an evaluation of the public policy arguments
underlying the application and validity of restrictive covenants in these
fields. In conclusion, this Note aims to draw a direct parallel between the
two professions, and advocates for an approach that holds noncompete
contracts in the field of medicine unethical.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Traditional Approach
Traditionally, courts placed a "heavy burden on employers to
justify the need for [noncompete contracts] and the reasonableness
7 Meridith Levinson, Non-compete Agreements: What IT Leaders Should Know, PC WORLD,
Aug. 20, zoo8, http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/15oo82/noncompeteagree-
mentswhat it leadersshouldknow.
8 Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 Pad 1277, iz8i (Ariz. 1999); see also Serena L.
Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Noncompetition Clauses in Professional Partnership
Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 31, 33 (1993).
9 Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.zd at 1281 (emphasis added); seealso RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CoNTRAcrs § 188 (1979).
io Michael J. Garrison & John T Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete
Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 107, 11o (Spring
2oo8).
i i See Peter M. Sfikas, Are Covenants Not to Compete Becoming Unenforceable? A Growing
Trend Explored, 136 J. AM. DENTAL Ass'N 1309, 1309-11 (Sept. 2005).
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of any postemployment restraint."'" Thus, under the common law
"reasonableness" test, courts favored the interests of the employee to those
of their employers. 3 Although noncompete contracts were permissible, the
courts at common law imposed significant limitations on such covenants.1
4
In order to ensure that they were "not overly burdensome to employees and
harmful to the marketplace," courts weighed the legitimate interests of the
employer in protecting the nature and success of his business against the
interests in the employee's ability to obtain employment. 5 Additionally,
courts valued the interests of society in maintaining the advantages of a
free economy even with such agreements in place.'
6
Under the traditional approach, in order to survive an attack on the
validity of a noncompete contract, the employer was required to show
a legitimate business or profit reason for any such covenant)7 The test
ensured that the agreement was "not a naked attempt to restrict free
competition."' 8 The purpose of any such agreement could not be merely
to contract against competition or to prevent a former employee from using
the skill or knowledge gained while working for a former employer. 9
Historically, courts recognized two legitimate business interests:
protecting (1) the goodwill and (2) the trade secrets of an employer.
20
In recognizing goodwill as an important asset of an employer's business,
courts generally held noncompete contracts that focused on preventing
a former employee from taking advantage of the employer's good name
and reputation to be fair and reasonable.2' Although originally deemed
a justification for enforcing noncompetes, the duty not to disclose the
employer's confidential information and trade secrets is actually quite
different in scope. Protecting trade secrets of a former employer imposes an
obligation that is continuous, reaching far beyond the boundaries imposed
by a restrictive covenant.2  When such a duty is imposed, an employee
12 See Garrison, supra note i o, at 1 i.
13 Id. at i 1o-11.
14 Id. at 115.
15 Id.
16 See Harlan Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625,650 (1960).
Professor Blake states that "[alnything that impedes an employee's freedom of access to a
job in which his productivity (and wages) would be higher, involves a cost in terms of the
economy's welfare." Id. As such, these are "important" economic considerations. Id.
17 See Garrison, supra note 1O, at 115.
18 Id.
19 See Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 669, 731-32 (1982).
20 See Garrison, supra note io, at 116; see also Handler, supra note 19, at 729.
21 Garrison, supra note io, at 116.
22 See, e.g., Omega Optical, Inc. v. Chroma Tech. Corp., 8oo A.zd IO64, to66 (Vt. zoo2)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1958) (noting the continuing duty of for-
mer employees not to disclose confidential information of the employer)).
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may not disclose the protected information even when the restraint of a
noncompete contract is lifted.2 3
Eventually, common law standards were altered to create a more relaxed
approach to noncompetes.14 The major development was to allow courts to
reform or partly rewrite such agreements as opposed to simply striking the
agreement in its entirety.2 5 Thus, instead of punishing zealous employers
for writing overly broad employment contracts, courts developed the "blue
pencil" test to relieve them of the heavy burden they had previously been
forced to carry.2 6 While the doctrine allowed courts to enforce separate
lawful portions within a contract or to alter language where a change was
grammatically possible, 7 a court could not create a new contract between
the parties.2 8 As such, an agreement could be altered only if its material
provisions remained unaffected after the revision. 9 While the blue pencil
test endured for several decades, reformation was considered a significant
23 See Garrison, supra note io, at 113.
24 Id. at 114.
25 Id. at ii8-I9.
26 Id. at i i l;see, e.g., Dicen v. New Sesco, Inc., 839 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind. 2005) (stating
that Indiana courts have "historically enforced reasonable restrictions, but struck unreason-
able restrictions, granted they are divisible"). This principle later became known as the blue
pencil test. Id.; see also Karlin v. Weinberg, 39o A.2d 1161, 1168 n.4 (N.J. 1978) (stating that
under New Jersey law, a court may modify the terms of a noncompete to make the terms of
the contract reasonable). But see Blake, supra note 16, at 681-82 (stating that although this
test is "still occasionally advanced as a reason for not enforcing a restraint drafted too broadly,
most courts either issue an injunction ... or refuse enforcement altogether") (internal citations
omitted); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 86 1 P.2d 531, 545 (Wyo. 1993) (noting that the
blue pencil test has been criticized and rejected by many courts).
27 See, e.g., Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 E Supp. zd 973,981 (D. Ariz. 2oo6) (finding that
"under limited circumstances," the application of the doctrine is acceptable if it "permit[s]
a Court to cross-out some unreasonable sections in favor of more reasonable ones without
rewriting them"); Varsity Gold, Inc. v. Porzio, 45 P.3d 352, 358-59 (Ariz. Ct. App. zooz) (ac-
knowledging that Arizona courts may use a "blue pencil" to eliminate unreasonable and gram-
matically severable provisions in a noncompete contract in order to preserve the valid portions
of the agreement) (internal citations omitted); see also Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 445
N.E.zd 556, 561 (Ind. 1983) (stating that "if the covenant is clearly separated into parts and
some parts are reasonable and others are not, the contract may be held divisible. The reason-
able restrictions may then be enforced").
28 See, e.g., E. Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 189 S.E.2d 22, 24 (S.C. 1972) ("We cannot make
a new agreement for the parties into which they did not voluntarily enter.").
29 See Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp.zd 68j, 687 (D. S.C. 2003) ("The sever-
ability of the contract must be determined from its language and subject matter; and where
the severable character of the agreement is not determinable from the contract itself, the
court, in order to uphold the contract, cannot create a new agreement for the parties, for ex-
ample, so as to make the restraint a partial restraint within a lesser area than that specified in
the covenant or for a lesser period of time.") (internal citations omitted). Such a change would
be material and, thus, is impermissible. Id.
.[Vol. 98
BAD MEDICINE?
change in the nature of noncompetes and is still applicable today.30
B. The Modern Survey
In effect, "the modern approach shifts the balance toward the employer's
interests in protecting its property and forestalling competition by former
employees. '31 In many states, noncompetes are "considered valid so long
as they are 'reasonably' imposed in terms of duration, geography and other
factors. '32  At one time, "some agreements contained lifetime bans."33
Today, periods of six months to two years are common in terms of the time
limitation.'
Currently, "many courts employ a balancing-of-interests test that is
more deferential to employers despite [the courts'] stated adherence to
the common law."3" Many states that initially followed a strict common law
reasonableness test have moved to allow for a more permissive approach for
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 (1981) (adopting the rule of refor-
mation). Florida, Michigan, and Texas statutes empower the courts to reform unreasonable
employee agreements not to compete. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(0 )(c) (West 2007); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a(i) (West 2002); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon
2002). See, e.g., Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1988); BDO Seidman v.
Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1226-27 (N.Y. 1999).
31 See Garrison, supra note Io, at 135.
32 See Armstrong, supra note 5.
33 George Reinfeld, The Ins and Outs of Non-compete Agreements, Articles.DI RECTO-
RYM.NET, http://articles.directorym.net/Thejlns and_Outs_oLNonCompeteAgreements_
DaytonOH-r9o7962-DaytonOH.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
34 Id; see, e.g., Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540, 544 (Ohio 1991) (hold-
ing that a duration of one year was reasonable); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.zd 544, 548
(Ohio 1975) (holding that a duration of three years was reasonable).
35 Garrison, supra note Io, at 123;see, e.g., Dobbins, DeGuire& Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford,
7o8 P.2d 577 580 (Mont. 1985) (holding that "the covenant should afford reasonable protec-
tion for and not impose an unreasonable burden upon the employer, the employee or the
public"); Vt. Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 315 A.2d 456,458 (Vt. 1974) (mandating enforcement
unless the agreement is contrary to public policy, unnecessary for protection of the employer,
or unnecessarily restrictive of the employees). Some states permit restrictive covenants of up
to five years. See, e.g., Med. Educ. Assistance Corp. v. State, 19 S.W.3d 803, 816 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2000) (enforcing a five-year noncompete agreement between a medical school and a faculty
physician, making special note of the important public interest in maintaining a viable medi-
cal school in upper east Tennessee).
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employee noncompete agreements. 3 6 In fact, several states have broadened
the scope of legitimate interests that can be protected by a noncompete.
37
For instance, protecting "highly specialized, current information not
generally known in the industry, created and stimulated by the research
environment furnished by the employer, to which the employee has been
' exposed' and 'enriched' solely due to his employment" is an interest that
has gained substantial recognition.
3
1
Furthermore, in recent years more emphasis has been placed on
employee education and training.39  Courts have begun to recognize a
legitimate interest in the extraordinary costs of employee education and
specialized training in order to validate the enforcement of restrictive
covenants.: Decisions that broaden the scope of legitimate noncompete
contracts may, however, "significantly expand the circumstances under
which an employer can conceivably justify an employee noncompete
agreement."
41
Nevertheless, the majority of courts still turn to factors analogous
to the common law reasonableness approach.4" This test balances the
36 Compare Crowell v. Woodruff, 245 S.W.zd 447,449 (Ky. 195 1) (stating that noncompete
contracts must be upheld if "the restraint is no greater than reasonably necessary to secure
the protection" of the employer's legitimate business interests), with Hammons v. Big Sandy
Claims Serv., Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (adopting the enforceability stan-
dard where a noncompete agreement is enforceable if "the restriction is such only as to afford
fair protection to the interests of the covenantee and is not so large as to interfere with the
public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted") (citing Ceresia v. Mitchell,
242 S.W.zd 359,364 (Ky. 195 1)); see also Briggs v. Butler, 45 N.E.2d 757, 763 (Ohio 1942) (Ohio
announced a three-part test to evaluate the enforceability of employee noncompete agree-
ments declaring postemployment restraints enforceable only when: (i) the restriction was not
"beyond that reasonably required for the protection of the employer in his business," (2) "the
provisions [were] not unreasonably restrictive upon the rights of the employee," and (3) the
covenant did "not contravene public policy."); cf Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.zd 544,
546-47 (Ohio 1975) (reformation reflected a pro-employer trend in noncompete agreements
and rejected the blue pencil test).
37 See Garrison, supra note in, at 127.
38 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 894 (N.J. 1988).
39 See Garrison, supra note 1o, at iz8; see, e.g., Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah
1982) (court held that "an extraordinary investment in the training or education of the em-
ployee" is an interest that deserved legitimate protection); Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579
So.2d 127, 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 199i) (court stated that an employer who "dedicates time
and money to the extraordinary training and education of an employee, whereby the em-
ployee attains a unique skill or an enhanced degree of sophistication in an existing skill," can
be warranted protection by means of a restrictive covenant); see also Borg-Warner Protective
Servs., Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495,501 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (the court enforced an
agreement not to compete, reasoning that the employer's investment in the employee clearly
had bearing on the balancing of the hardship to the employee and the public interest).
40 See Reinfeld supra note 33; Garrison, supra note io, at I 28-29.
41 See Garrison, supra note io, at 128.
42 Id. at 117-2o.
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reasonableness of the duration of the agreement, 4 the geographic area
covered,44 and the business activities restricted by the covenant.4s Under
the current test, the scope of a restrictive covenant between an employer
and his employee "cannot be broader than reasonably necessary to protect
the legitimate interests of the employer. .. ".I- This concern is exactly why
courts are disinclined to uphold noncompete contracts that preclude an
employee from engaging in a similar business or that inhibit an employee's
ability to work for a competitor in any capacity.47 Such a rule forces a closer
reading of the contract by the court, as well as much more precise drafting
by most employers.
In some states, statutes permitting restrictive covenants have begun to
lose their force. 4' For instance, in California, the operative code section
provides that "every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging
in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.
49
That section has been interpreted to prohibit "any agreement that restricts
an employee from working for a competitor of his former employer or
imposing a penalty for doing so.''s Trade secrets are the only consistently
recognized exception, because they protect a company's confidential
customer lists and proprietary information."s
43 Most courts limit such contracts to a duration of six (6) months to two (2) years. See,
e.g., Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 86I P.2d 531, 544-45 (Wyo. 1993) (holding that the
three year restriction provided by the noncompete contract would be in violation of public
policy, but stating that one year would be both reasonable and "sufficient to moderate the
risk" to the employer). Some courts, however, have also upheld noncompete contracts that
provide for an even longer duration. See, e.g., Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care, Inc. v.
Gidick, 389 S.E.2d 467, 470 (Va. 199o) (stating that an agreement which provides for a three
(3) year restriction is reasonable); Roanoke Eng'g Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.zd 882,887
(Va. 1982) (holding the same).
44 See Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, i i9 S.E.zd 533, 539-40 (S.C. 1961) (stating that
to be reasonable, the noncompete "must not be unduly harsh and oppressive on the em-
ployee"). Thus, as to the geographic area, the limitation is unreasonable, unduly harsh, and
oppressive "when the contract tends to deprive the employee the opportunity of supporting
himself and his family." Id.
45 See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 E Supp.zd 667, 683-84 (S.D. Ind.
1998) (the type of activities that the noncompete agreement prohibits an employee from en-
gaging in must be tied to the legitimate interests an employer is seeking to protect).
46 See Garrison, supra note io, at i18.
47 Id; see, e.g., Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 767 N.W.2d 898, 911 (Wis. 2009) (holding in-
valid a business clause which prohibited the former employee from engaging "in any business
which is substantially similar to or in competition with the business" of the employer) (emphasis
added).
48 See Star Direct, Inc., 767 N.W.zd at 911; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § i66oo (West
2004).
49 § i66oo.
50 See Garrison, supra note io, at i 20; see also Edwards v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 189 P.3d
285, 288 (Ca. 2008).
51 See Garrison, supra note io, at 120.
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California is unique in that it has both statutorily and judicially declared
void any contract by which a former employee is barred from engaging in
any similar lawful business or trade."2 By contrast, several states have read
their codes to allow a more permissive approach. 3 Generally, contracts not
tocompete are "disfavored" in Tennessee-' and Virginia;"5 only covenants
that "implicate important public policy issues" are reviewed under a
stricter analysis.5 6  Similarly, several other courts have proclaimed that
"employment noncompete agreements are looked upon with disfavor.""
Increasingly, courts are "looking at the noncompete agreements with more
skepticism, finding that such contracts frequently go too far in restraining
employees, especially salespeople."58
52 Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (zoo5); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (West
2007), with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 166oo (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987).
53 MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (z005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (1993); see also Garrison,
supra note io, at 121 ("Regulatory statutes in other states limit the enforceability of employee
noncompete agreements to a lesser extent than in California."). By statute, Wisconsin voids
any overbroad agreement not to compete. See Wis. STAT. § 103.465 (2004). Colorado refuses to
enforce employee agreements not to compete other than restrictive covenants of high-level
employees, executive and management personnel, and officers and employees who constitute
professional staff to executive and management personnel. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-I 13(2)(d)
(2oo8).
54 Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 678 (Tenn. 2005) (citing
Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tenn. 1984)). Note that the Tennessee
legislature has since acted to permit physician noncompete agreements. See Cent. Ind.
Podiatry, P.C. v. Krueger, 882 N.E.zd 723, 728 (Ind. 2008) (citing Act of June 21, 2007, 2007
Tenn. Pub. Acts 487 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-148, effective Jan. I, 2008) (permit-
ting physician noncompete agreements if they are in writing, last two years or less, and keep
within certain geographical limitations)).
55 See, e.g., Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.zd 666,678 (Va. 2oo1) (invalidating a noncompete
contract which provided that the employee could not "directly or indirectly, own, manage,
control, be employed by, participate in, or be connected in any manner with ownership, man-
agement, operation, or control of any business similar to the type of business conducted by
the [e]mployer" for a period of three years). According to the Supreme Court of Virginia, such
an agreement is an "unnecessary and unreasonable restraint of trade" that is unduly harsh,
oppressive, and "offensive to the public policy of the Commonwealth." Id.; see also Omniplex
World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investigations Servs., Inc., 618 S.E.zd 340,342-43 (Va. 2oo5) (stating
that "restrictive covenants are disfavored restraints on trade" and holding that the covenant
was "overbroad and unenforceable").
56 Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, 166 S.W.3d at 679.
57 Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.zd 356,361 (Minn. 1098) (quoting Bennett v. Storz
Broad. Co., 134 N.W2d 892, 898 (Minn. 1965)); see also Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc.,
861 P.zd 531, 539 (Wyo. 1993); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F Supp.zd 667,683-
84 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (finding the covenant overbroad because it limited former employee from
working for a competitor in any capacity and precluded him from selling products that were
not directly competitive); see also Garrison, supra note 1o, at 113.
58 See Reinfeld, supra note 33.
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C. The Emerging Trend
Taken together, these changes in the law "have substantially altered
the legal landscape for employees bound by covenants not to compete."' 9
Some argue that the new trend in the law of noncompetes is an "assault on
the modern approach." 6 Others claim that the emerging trend "suggests
that courts are generally more inclined to invalidate employee noncompete
agreements," emphasizing the importance of protecting employees'
interests in mobility and the ability to make a living in their own trade.6'
More stringent scrutiny of such contractual clauses reflects changes in our
economy and in the modern workplace.
6
1
The newest approach retreats from modern decisions, focusing instead
on limiting what is considered a legitimate business interest under restrictive
covenants, as well as limiting the courts' powers of reformation. 63 Recently,
the Virginia Supreme Court produced a string of surprising opinions that
depart from the modern approach by requiring a closer connection between
the language of the noncompete agreement and the asserted interests of
the employer.64 Other states have followed this example. 65 In sum, these
recent opinions that delineate a trend in favor of employee mobility and
competition have made both drafting and enforcement of noncompetes a
challenge for employers.66
Finally, the changing nature of the typical employment relationship,
particularly the extinction of the traditional long-term, life-loyal employee,
must be considered when analyzing restrictive covenants today.67
Well suited for the old employer-employee relationship, noncompete
agreements presently seem outdated, stifling modern employees who
yearn for a greater breadth of experience.68 Unlike the traditional model
59 Garrison, supra note 10, at 135.
60 Id. at iii.
6i Id. at 112.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 135-39; see, e.g., Nat'l Employment Serv. Corp. v. Olsten Staff. Serv., Inc., 761
A.2d 401,405 (N.H. 2ooo) (stating that the costs associated with employee recruitment are not
legitimate business interests of an employer).
64 See Omniplex World Servs., Corp. v. U.S. Investigations Servs., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 340,
342-43 (Va. 2005); Modern Env'ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 561 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Va. 2002); Simmons
v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 561, 678 (Va. 2001); Motion Control Sys., Inc. v. East, 546 S.E.2d 424,
425-26 (Va. 2001 ); see also Garrison, supra note i o, at 138.
65 See, e.g., OKL.& STAT. ANN. tit. I5, § 219A (2007).
66 Garrison, supra note xo, at 148.
67 Id. at 165; see also Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyally in the Information
Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 8o
OR. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (zooI); Katherine V. W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the
Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REv. 721, 731 (2002).
68 See Garrison, supra note io, at 166.
2009-2010]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
which emphasized employee loyalty and promotion within the workplace,
the primary characteristics of the new relationship are "mobility, a lack
of job security, and limited loyalty by either employees or employers." 69
Competition forces new strategies in the structure of most organizations.
II. DISCUSSION: ANALYZING AND COMPARING NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS
IN THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS
A. Restrictive Covenants in the Legal Profession
Restrictive covenants have been consistently held unethical in the
practice of law. Since the adoption of its first code of professional conduct,
the American Bar Association (ABA) has plainly "prohibited restrictive
covenants between attorneys."7 While some law firms have inevitably
resorted to using restrictive covenants, such agreements have been
consistently invalidated on public policy grounds.7 The only outward limit
on this conduct are the bounds of the law itself, which emphasizes that all
actions of the lawyer must be "solely for the benefit of the client and free
of compromising influences and loyalties."7 " Under the rules, nothing at all
"should be permitted to dilute" this relationship and the duty owed by an
attorney to his client.73
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the ABA
dictate that a lawyer shall not participate in making "a partnership,
shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement
that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship." 
7 4
The rule provides two exceptions: an agreement concerning benefits
upon retirement or "an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's
right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy."75 Thus,
the provisions specifically assert that an attorney may not enter into an
agreement under any circumstances that restricts his right to practice law.76
Furthermore, the comments to the Model Rules explain that an agreement
restricting an attorney's right to practice upon leaving a firm not only limits
69 Id.
70 Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.ad 1277, i82 (Ariz. 1999); see also Paula Berg,
Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete Between Physicians: Protecting Doctors' Interests at
Patients' Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 37 (1992).
71 See Sfikas, supra, note i i, at 13 o; see, e.g., Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C.,
811 S.W. ad 528, 529-30 (Tenn. 1991). A law firm sough to enforce a deferred compensation
agreement - essentially a noncompete in disguise - against a former associate. The court de-
termined that the covenant was contrary to public interest. Id.
72 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (i98o).
73 Id.
74 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.6(a) (aoo3) (emphasis added).




his or her professional autonomy, but restricts the "freedom of clients to
choose a lawyer.
77
Additionally, the comments elucidate that the purpose of section (b) is to
prevent a settlement by an attorney on behalf of a client which potentially
places a restriction on a lawyer's ability to represent any other person in
connection with that claim.7" Settlements that mandate that a lawyer not
represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of
a client are prohibited. 9 In contrast, as the comments explain, this rule
does not apply to the terms of the sale of a law practice. 0 The emphasis of
the rule is on protecting the interests of the client, not a firm's pecuniary
interests in preventing the former employee from competing.
The Model Code rule is an analogue to the rule found in the Model
Rules. The two are nearly identical in that requiring an employed attorney
to sign a noncompete under most circumstances is against the ethics of the
profession."' Just like the Model Rules, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not be a party to or participate
in a partnership or employment agreement with another lawyer that
restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of a
relationship created by the agreement, except as a condition to payment
of retirement benefits."' A general restriction on the right to practice is
deemed "unwarranted" and "inconsistent with [an attorney's] professional
status."' The Code provides that, "[iun connection with the settlement
of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that
restricts his right to practice law.""
Comparatively, most jurisdictions have promulgated rules of
professional conduct based on the Model Rules. s Texas and Kentucky
are two examples. Texas Rule 5.06 is nearly identical to Model Rule 5.6.86
77 Id. at cmt. I.
78 Id. at cmt. 2.
79 Id.
80 Id. at cmt. 3.
8I MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILIrY DR z-Io8(A) (198o); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003).
82 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-Io8(A) (198o).
83 ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.6(a)-(b) (2003).
84 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-Io8(B) (198o).
85 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003); see also AM. LEGAL ETHICS
LIBRARY, TOPICAL OVERVIEW, http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/ (follow "Listing by topic" hy-
perlink; then scroll down to 5.6: 1o Comparative Analysis) (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) (the fol-
lowing states have adopted rules of professional conduct that are directly based on the Model
Rules: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, D.C., Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas).
86 TEx. Discip. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.06 (2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
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The only difference is the additional clause in the Texas rule at the end
of subsection (b), stating that an agreement restricting a lawyer's right to
practice can be made "as part of the settlement of a disciplinary proceeding
against a lawyer.""7  Enacted by its Supreme Court, the Kentucky rule
tracks the language of Model Rule 5.6(a).1 However, unlike Model Rule
5.6(b),8 9 which refers to a "client controversy," the Kentucky rule refers to
a "controversy between private parties."9 Lastly, because Kentucky has
not yet adopted Model Rule 1.17 dealing with the sale of a law practice,
comment 3 does not appear in the commentary to its Rules of Professional
Conduct.91
As mandated by the Model Rules, the Kentucky rule also states that a
lawyer may not procure a settlement which restricts his right to practice in
the future.9 The Kentucky Bar Association has held that it is a violation
of the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct to condition the receipt of
certain payments due to a withdrawing partner on an agreement restricting
him from practicing in Kentucky for two years.93 Similarly, under the
Kentucky rules an attorney may not include in the firm's employment
agreement a restrictive covenant prohibiting the associate from practicing
law within a stated distance of the attorney's office upon termination.
94
Such holdings carry out precisely the same purpose as the Model Rules
and comments.
Unlike the rules in most jurisdictions, New York's Rules of Professional
Conduct are based on DR 2-108(A) of the Model Code.9 In substance,
the New York rule is identical to Model Rule 5.6 as well. 96 New York DR
CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003); see, e.g., Tex. Ethics Op. 466 (199,); Tex. Ethics Op. 459 (1988).
87 Tx. DisciP. OF RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.o6(b) (2oo9).
88 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003); Ky. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 5.6
(2oo6); see also AM. LEGAL ETHICS LIBRARY, supra note 85. The Kentucky rule differs only
slightly from the Model Rule. Unlike the Model rule, the Kentucky rule does not specifically
refer to shareholder or other types of agreements; it refers to 'agreements' in general. This
difference is immaterial to the content and effect of the rule as a whole. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003); Ky. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 5.6 (2oo6).
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2003).
90 Ky. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 5.6(b) (2OO6).
91 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.6 cmt. 3 (2003); AM. LEGAL ETHICS LIBRARY, supra note 85.
92 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003); Ky. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 5.6(b)
(zoo6).
93 Ky. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Opinion, No. E-326 (1987); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.6 (20o3); AM. LEGAL ETHICS LIBRARY, supra note 85.
94 Ky. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Opinion, No. E -176 (1977); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003); AM. LEGAL ETHICS LIBRARY, supra note 85.
95 N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSBILIT DR 2-1o8 (2oo3);seealso MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILr Y DR 2-Io8(A) (198o); AM. LEGAL ETHICS LIBRRY, supra note 85.
96 N.Y CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-Io8 (2003); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1o8(A) (198o); AM. LEGAL ETHICS LIBRARY, supra note 85; see
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2-108(A) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not be party to or participate in a
partnership or employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts
the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship
created by the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement
benefits." 97 Case law dictates, for instance, that a law firm violates DR
2-108(A) if its partnership agreement provides that partners who withdraw
from the firm and, as a result, become direct competitors must forfeit profits
already earned before leaving the firm.98 In contrast, however, arbitration
awards which reduce the amount paid to a withdrawing partner according
to income derived from other sources are permissible and do not violate
DR 2-108 with respect to noncompetes. I
Furthermore, in connection with settlements restricting a lawyer's right
to future practice, the New York rule provides that "a lawyer shall not enter
into an agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law."'0 New
York courts have held, however, that as part of the settlement in a mass tort
suit, defendants may, nonetheless, take part in an agreement which would
prevent plaintiffs' attorneys from representing any similar clients in the
future. 01 Despite this judicial rule, it is still a recognized principle that
an attorney's freedom to contract and practice cannot be precluded by a
settlement agreement. °1 Public policy is the backbone of this rationale.
On the other hand, California, unlike any other jurisdiction, has
enacted its own rules of professional conduct.10 3 California's counterpart
to Mode Rule 5.6 contains both superficial and substantive differences.
The California rule, for instance, prohibits agreements made in connection
with the settlement of a lawsuit without limitations, while the Model
also infra notes 97 - 100.
97 N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1o8 (2003).
98 See, e.g., Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,410 (1989).
99 See Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 86 N.Y.2d 146,156-57 (1995).
oo N.Y. CODE OF PRO'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-Io8(B) (2003).
io Id. But see Feldman v. Minars, 230 A.D.2d 356, 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (conclud-
ing that while an argument to the contrary could be made under the Rules of Professional
Responsibility, "an agreement by counsel not to represent similar plaintiffs in similar actions
against a contracting party is not against the public policy of the State of New York"). Notably,
the Court also remarked in its opinion that even if such an agreement "is against the public
policy of this State, the 'violation' can be addressed by the appropriate disciplinary authori-
ties." Id. (internal quotations omitted.) As such, the court left open the possibility of a future
holding that would follow the New York Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. See also Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 53 F Supp. 2d 338, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(noting that the "rule against restrictive covenants has been criticized as 'an anachronism, il-
logical and bad policy,' particularly in the context of mass torts," and upholding the agreement
that restricted "the right of a single defendant" to counsel by which he was represented in
the present lawsuit).
102 N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1o8(B) (2003).
103 CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1-500 (1992); see also, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003); Am. Legal Ethics Library, supra note 85.
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Rules prohibit only agreements made in connection with the settlement
of a private lawsuit.' According to the ABA, the difference is only one
of semantics.10 s Furthermore, both rules allow restrictions on the right to
practice with regard to agreements concerning benefits upon retirement'1 6
Additionally, both rules allow restrictions on the right to practice law in
employment and partnership agreements so long as the restriction does not
extend beyond the termination of the employment or partnership. 107
The broader scope of the California rule is the most meaningful
difference between the rules. Unlike the Model rule, the California rule
dictates that a lawyer may not offer or make any type of "an agreement" that
restricts the right of an attorney to practice law.' The latter rule includes
agreements that may have an incidental or indirect effect on a lawyer's right
to practice, as well as any such collateral agreements (although it is silent
regarding its application to the sale of a law practice)." 9 The California rule
is also substantially similar to the Model Code rule.
As stated, the purpose of the California rule is to protect the "historical
right of the public to counsel of choice," under the belief that restrictive
covenants "not only interfere with a member's professional autonomy, but
also interfere with the public's right to counsel of choice." 10 In addressing
the scope of its rule, the California Supreme Court has held that "[an
agreement that assesses a reasonable cost against a partner who chooses
to compete with his or her former partners does not restrict" a lawyer from
practicing law in the sense intended by the rule."1 Rather, a reasonable
cost merely "attaches an economic consequence to a departing partner's
unrestricted choice to pursue a particular kind of practice.""' Any such
fee, however, cannot be unconscionable.1 1 3 Finally, although the scope of
the California rule is broad, there is an important exception to the rule
io4 Compare CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1-500 (1992), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003).
105 ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-394 (1995).
io6 CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1-500 (1992); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
5.6 (2OO3); Am. LEGAL ETHICS LIBRARY, supra note 85.
107 CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT I-5OO(A)(i) (1992); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-io8(A) (198o); seealso ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility,
Informal Op. 171 (197).
io8 CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT i-5oo(A) (1992) (emphasis added); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1o8(A) (1980).
io9 CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1-500 (1992).
I io AM. LEGAL ETHICS LIBRAl Y, R.5.6:zoo Comparative Analysis, http://www.law.cornell.
edu/ethics/comparative/ (scroll down to 5.6:200; follow CA hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 28,
2009).
III Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 15o, I56 (Cal. 1993).
I12 Id.
113 CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 4-200 (1992); see also Champion v. Super. Ct., 247
Cal.Rptr. 624, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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against settlements which restrict an attorney's practice of law. Specifically,
the rule "exempts agreements in lieu of disciplinary prosecution entered
into between attorneys and the State Bar ... and conditions of probation
imposed by the State Bar Court incident to discipline from this rule's
prohibitions."'"1 4 Therefore, an attorney may agree to restrict his or her law
practice when such an agreement is made in connection with a state bar
disciplinary proceeding."-'
Just as the rules of professional conduct promulgated in each jurisdiction,
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers also includes a provision
prohibiting restrictions on a lawyer's right to practice." 6 The Restatement
provides that "[a] lawyer may not offer or enter into a law-firm agreement
that restricts the right of the lawyer to practice law after terminating the
relationship, except for a restriction incident to the lawyer's retirement from
the practice of law."" 7 The Restatement prescribes that "[iun settling a
client claim, a lawyer may not offer or enter into an agreement that restricts
the right of the lawyer to practice law, including the right to represent or
take particular action on behalf of other clients.""' Thus, the message and
purpose of the Restatement rules are identical to that promulgated by the
ABA.
In approaching noncompete agreements, courts give credence to the
position of the ABA." 9 For instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the practice of law is "different from a common business
or trade because lawyers deal with clients, not merchandise, and lawyers
have a duty to make legal counsel available to the public."'' 0 The rules
promulgated by the ABA Ethics Committee demonstrate the strong view
that the practice of law is unlike a common business or trade.' Lawyers,
unlike accountants, merchants, and court reporters, have a duty to make
legal counsel available to the public.12 With its emphasis on professional
freedom and the client's freedom to choose, the rules prohibiting restrictions
114 See Am. Legal Ethics Library, supra note 1 o.
115 See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-500 (1992); CAL. Bus & PROF'L CODE §
6o9 2.5 6) (West 2003); see also AM. LEGAL ETHICS LIBRARY, supra note 85.
116 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 13 (2000).
117 Id. at§ 130).
I I8 Id. at § 13(2).
119 See Garrison, supra note io, at 148; see also Sfikas, supra note 1i, at 13 10.
120 Sfikas, supra note I I, at 131o;seeSpiegel v.Thomas, Mann & Smith, PC., 811 S.Wad
528, 529-30 (Tenn. 1991) (noting the position of the American Bar Association's Ethics
Committee); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-I (1980).
121 See, e.g., Elaine Marie Tomko, Annotation, Enforceability of Agreement Restricting Right
of Attorney to Compete with Former Law Firm, 28 A.L.R.5 th 420, 430 (1995) (discussing why
noncompete contracts in the employment context are unlike such covenants in the context
of trade).
122 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (198o) (emphasis added);seesupra
Tomko, note 121, at 430-31.
2009-20101
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
on a lawyer's right to practice are often considered the most unique and
important in the body of legal ethics.' 23
While business and commercial standards may be used to evaluate the
reasonableness of a covenant not to compete in most any field, the legal
profession is unique in that restrictions in this field are largely injurious
to the public as a whole. I2 4 When it comes to developing a lawyer-client
relationship, a client is entitled to representation by the attorney of his
choice, notwithstanding traditional considerations.' The "relationship
is consensual, highly fiduciary on the part of counsel," and there is no
other principle in the practice of law and professional responsibility that is
"more deeply rooted."'' l 6 Due to the importance and the privacy inherent
in the lawyer-client relationship, attorneys "are often held to what almost
amounts to a per se rule prohibiting non-competition contracts"' 7 because
the integrity of the legal profession lies in the client's freedom to choose.
B. Restrictive Covenants Between Physicians
When assessing the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant, the inquiry
with respect to agreements between physicians is much the same: fact
specific and largely dependent on the totality of the circumstances.18 The
general rule is that a restriction in a physician's covenant not to compete
will be found unreasonable if (1) "the restraint is greater than necessary
to protect the employer's legitimate interests"; or (2) if that interest "is
123 See Valley Med. Specialists v. Faber, D.O., 982 P.2d 1277, 1283 (Ariz. 1999); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003); see, e.g., ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 5.6
cmt. 1(2003).
124 See ValleyMed. Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1283 ("Commercial standards may not be used
to evaluate the reasonableness of lawyer restrictive covenants. Strong public policy consider-
ations preclude their applicability. In that sense, lawyer restrictions are injurious to the public
interest."); see also Spiegel, 811 S.W.2d at 530 (concluding that the noncompete in question
was invalid "as a matter of public policy"); Arena v. Schulman, LeRoy & Bennett, 233 S.W.3d
8o9, 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2oo6) (holding that "the connection of the financial disincentive to
the practice of law constitutes, whether intended or not, an impermissible restraint on the
practice of law").
125 Daylon L. Welliver, Note, When the Walls Come A 'Tumblin' Down: A Look at What
Happens When Lawyers Sign Non-Competition Agreements and Break Them, 29 IND. L. REV. 729,
729-33 (1996) (traditional considerations include whether or not the employee has acquired
certain specialized skills by working for the employer or has become familiar with the employ-
er's privileged information or business secrets); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
5.6 (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1o8 (1980).
126 Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 500 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1975); see also Valley Med.
Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1283.
127 See Welliver, supra note 125, at 736.
128 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 cmt. a (1981); see also id. at § 188 cmt.
a; Bryceland v. Northey, 772 Pzd 36,40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that "[e]ach case hinges
on its own particular facts").
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outweighed by the hardship to the [employee] and the likely injury to the
public."'2 9 The prevailing consideration, much like in the legal profession,
is the issue of the "public good" and policy.3 ' These considerations,
however, seem to be given much more value in theory than in practice.
Typically, courts find some legitimate interest that warrants the validity
of a noncompete between physicians. 131 In evaluating such covenants, many
courts continue to apply the "reasonableness standard."'131 Under this rule,
most agreements between physicians are upheld if reasonable. 133 Courts
generally uphold noncompete agreements among physicians concluding
that employers' traditional interests in protecting their businesses are
reasonable.' 34 Ironically, courts have even upheld the employer's interests
in protecting their patient relationships. 13 Although the American Medical
Association (AMA) has "taken the position that physicians' noncompete
agreements have a negative effect on health care and are not in the public
interest," decisions in accord with this position are far and few.
136
The AMA has proposed for many years that noncompete agreements
among physicians are contrary to public policy.'37 Still, despite its
contentions that noncompete agreements disrupt the continuity of care and
potentially deprive the public of medical services, "most courts continue to
enforce physicians' noncompete agreements." 33 For years, the AMA has
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a (1981); see also Blake, supra note
16, at 648-49.
130 Sfikas, supra note I I, at 13 1o; see also Blake, supra note 16, at 69 1.
131 See, e.g., Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists, I1z P.3d 8i, 89 (Kan. zoo5) (referral
services deemed a justifiable interest for upholding physician noncompete agreement); Wood
v. Acordia of W. Va., Inc., 618 S.E.zd 415,422 (W. Va. 2005) (a non-solicitation agreement was
held legitimate on the basis of lesser restrictions of employees' rights).
132 See Crowell v. Woodruff, 245 S.W.zd 447, 449 (Ky. 1951); Hammons v. Big Sandy
Claims Serv., Inc., 567 S.W.zd 313,315 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Briggs v. Butler, 45 N.E.zd 757, 763
(Ohio 1942); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546-47 (Ohio 1975).
133 See, e.g., Cent. Ind. Podiatry, P.C. v. Krueger, 88z N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ind. 2oo8) (holding
that "noncompetition agreements between a physician and a medical practice group are not
per se void as against public policy and are enforceable to the extent they are reasonable. To
be geographically reasonable, the agreement may restrict only that area in which the physician
developed patient relationships using the practice group's resources").
134 See, e.g., Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 95-96 (Kan. 1996) (enforcing a restrictive
covenant on the conclusion that its restrictions were reasonable); Cmty. Hosp. Group, Inc. v.
More, 869 A.zd 884,900 (N.J. 2005) (enforcing modified noncompete contract on determina-
tion that employer had a legitimate business interest warranting protection).
135 Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d i6i, 1169 (N.J. 1978) (recognizing an employer's legiti-
mate business interest in protecting patient relationships in noncompetition covenants).
136 Sfikas, supra note i I, at 1310.
137 SeeAMA. CODE OF MED. ETHICS, § E-9.O2 (1998); see also Berg, supra note 7o, at 6.
138 See Sfikas, supra note I I, at 1311; see also Gillespie v. Carbondale & Marion Eye Ctrs.,
Ltd., 622 N.E.zd 1267, 1270 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) ("[Rlestrictive covenants between medical
doctors are not detrimental to the public interest because the restricted doctor can be just
as useful to the public in another location outside the restricted area; and the physician can
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claimed that such covenants are strongly contrary to the interests of the
public,'3 9 and although such covenants are not prohibited, they are strongly
discouraged and disfavored by physicians' organizations.1 Repeatedly, the
AMA has stated that the right to choose his or her own physician is the right
of every patient and a "prerequisite of optimal care andethicalpractice." 14' The
reiationship between a patient and his physician is so private and intimate
that the patient's right to choose his own doctor is the cornerstone of any
ethical practice.
As a result of this persistence, several courts have begun to recognize
and give credit to the AMA's claim that noncompete contracts not only
impede and discourage competition, but "disrupt continuity of care, and
potentially deprive the public of medical services."' 42 Ten years ago, in
a landmark decision, the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated a restrictive
employment agreement, holding that the contract between a medical
practice group and one of the employees was unreasonably overbroad.
143
In 2000, a physician's noncompete agreement was also held unenforceable
by an Indiana appellate court for failure to show a "protectable" business
interest. 144 While the courts invalidating restrictive agreements between
doctors are in the minority, more jurisdictions seem to have developed
a higher awareness and respect for the recommendations of the AMA.
45
Today, "more and more courts ... are holding these covenants unenforceable
for public policy reasons."'146
In 2005, for instance, a private medical practice filed a complaint against
a physician and former employee "seeking to enjoin him from violating the
non-compete provision of his employment agreement."'' 47 The Supreme
Court of Tennessee held the covenant unenforceable "[d]ue to the
important public policy considerations implicated by physicians' covenants
not to compete, along with the ethical problems raised by them."'148 The
thrust of the discussion was an evaluation of the AMA's position toward such
contracts, as well as a comparison between the practice of medicine and the
always resume his practice in the restricted zone once the time duration of the covenant not
to compete has expired.").
139 SeeValley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1282 (Ariz. 1999).
140 Id.; AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS, § E-9.O2 (1998).
141 Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1282 (emphasis added); Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll,
594 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ohio Ct. App. i99e); see also AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS, § E-9.o6
(1998).
142 Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674,679 (Tenn. 2005).
143 Valley Med. Specialties, 982 P.2d at 1286.
144 Duneland Emergency Physician's Med. Group, P.C. v. Brunk, 723 N.E.2d 963, 967
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
145 See Sfikas, supra note I I, at 131 1.
146 Id.
147 Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, 166 S.W.3d at 677.
148 Id. at 683.
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practice of law. 149 Nonetheless, in a majority of states, including Tennessee,
statutory provisions still allow for restrictions on the right of an employee
or contracted healthcare provider to remain in effect upon termination or
conclusion of the employment. 10 Despite the slow movement by courts
to invalidate restrictive covenants between physicians, in some states the
legislature has taken part in the battle to continue the enforcement of such
agreements.
C. Drawing Parallels in Public Policy & Advocatingfor a Similar Approach
Given the vast number of decisions upholding restrictive covenants
among doctors, the implication is that noncompete clauses in physicians'
employment agreements will generally be enforceable. The parallels in
public policy concerns between the legal and medical professions, however,
make it difficult not to question the differing approaches. Arguably,
"having a greater number of physicians practicing in a community benefits
the public by providing greater access to health care."'' "Increased
competition for patients tends to improve quality of care and keep costs
affordable."'5 2 The same is essentially true for the practice of law. A greater
number of attorneys concentrated in an area means that representation is
readily available; a greater number of attorneys in the same region results
in a greater variety of available services.
Most importantly, the right of every individual to choose his or her
physician is directly synonymous with a client's ability to choose his or her
attorney. 53 Over time, these relationships become intimate and personal.-
4
After years of being seen by the same doctor, patients hesitate to switch to
a different primary care physician just as many clients return to the same
attorney for representation time and again.' In the medical context, the
importance of a patient's ability to choose is paramount. Contracting around
this right with a third party, such as a hospital administrator or a business
partner, seems dangerously unethical.5 6
149 Id. at 679-84.
15o TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-148 (2008) (restrictions on health care provider practice).
151 Murfreesboro Afed. Clinic, 166 S.W.3d at 679.
152 Sfikas, supra note i i, at 1310.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1310--1 i;see also Mandeville v. Harman, 7 A. 37,40 (N.J. Ch. 1886).
156 See Mandenville, 7 A. at 40-41. In Mandenville, the court noted that "[pirofessional
skill, experience, and reputation are things which cannot be bought or sold" because they
are part of an individual, not a practice. Id. at 40. The patient chooses his physician based
on that skill and experience. Thus, because the "practice of a physician is a thing so purely
personal, depending so absolutely on the confidence reposed in his personal skill and ability,"
noncompete contracts among physicians are impractical due to the difficulty they pose for the
patient. Id. at. 40-41.
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Upon close examination of the likeness of these professional fields,
the courts' traditional justification for enforcement of such noncompete
covenants does not seem applicable.'57 Given the public interest in
doctor-patient relationships, the validity of restrictive covenants between
physicians does not seem justified. Originally, the inquiry was phrased in
terms of "whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to
the interest of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to
interfere with the interest of the public."'5s8 Now, the inquiry seems focused
on the public policy that, first and foremost, considers patients' interests. In
cases specifically involving professions such as law and medicine, "public
policy concerns may outweigh any protectable interest the remaining firm
members may have."'59
While scholars have argued that noncompete agreements are
instrumental in protecting employers' investments in human capital, this
model no longer seems to fit. For example, a shortage of physicians in a
particular specialty, as well as in the geographic area, has been a concern
in several jurisdictions.' 6 For instance, in adopting a more sensible public
policy in favor of an employee's freedom of movement, the Supreme
Court of Alabama stated that "a severe shortage of doctors in a medical
specialty" was a significant factor in considering the legitimacy of a
restrictive covenant. 16  Restrictive agreements among those practicing
medicine "inconvenience patients and interfere with their access to health
care" by either interfering with the patient's ability to see a physician in a
convenient location or by minimizing the number of specialists available
within a certain area.
62
Undeniably "strong public policy considerations preclude" the
applicability of noncompetes in the practice of law. ' 63 The reasoning behind
courts' refusals to enforce physicians' noncompetes has less to do with
individuals' freedom of movement, and more to do with people's freedom
of choice 64 A doctor's relationship with the patient is singular, private,
157 See also Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.2d 1277, 1282-83 (Ariz. 1999) (discussing strong
policy considerations weighing against covenants not to compete in the medical arena).
158 Mandenville, 7 A. at 39.
159 Valley Med. Speialists, 982 P.zd at tz82.
i6o See, e.g., Odess v. Taylor, 211 So.2d 805, 8Io (Ala. 1968). In Odess, the Supreme Court
of Alabama stated that it is "common knowledge that there is now an acute shortage of phy-
sicians and surgeons in Alabama, particularly in specialized fields of practice." Id. Thus,
according to the court, the public "would suffer by removing a highly trained specialist from
practicing his profession in that area."Id. As a result, Odess held "it would be adverse to the
public interest to enjoin the [physician] from practicing his profession" under the restrictions
imposed by the noncompete. Id.
161 Kafkersupra note 8, at 38-39 (discussing the outcome of Odess v. Taylor).
162 Berg, supra note 70, at 48.
163 See Dwyer v. Jung, 336 Azd. 498, 500 (N.J. 1975).
164 See also Kafker, supra note 8, at 39-40.
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and maintained in order to advance the patient's best interests, just as the
client's relationship with his attorney when he seeks legal representation.
Neither relationship is based on principles of commerce. "Prevent[ing]
competitive use, for a time, of information or relationships which pertain
peculiarly to the employer and which the employee acquired in the course
of the employment" should not be a concern given weighty consideration in
light of the patients' interests at stake. .65 Despite the freedom to contract,
contracts among physicians affect the public to a much greater extent than
contracts which deal with an ordinary employer-employee relationship.
Several courts have emphasized the special "difference between a
profession and a trade or business, characterizing the relationship between
doctor and patient as similar to that between lawyer and client."' 66 Just like
an attorney-client relationship, the doctor-patient relationship is not built
on the exchange or sale of goods, because the patient is not a "customer."1 67
That relationship is one built on "personal confidence."' '  Most doctor-
patient relationships are continuous, and when they end abruptly, the
severance of ties tends to negatively impact the patient. 69 Studies have
shown that longstanding relationships between patients and physicians
"impact positively on many aspects of health care."1 0 Thus, because this
relationship between doctor-patient is indisputably important and unique,
a noncompete agreement between an employee-doctor and his employer
obstructs it directly.
Finally, members of the legal and medical professions are held to the
highest standard of trust and virtue. These professions are still some of the
most revered in our society and clients and patients alike typically have
high expectations. Until this day, prior to being admitted to practice, future
attorneys and doctors take an oath that proclaims that those entering into
membership will "subscribe to and ... abide" by the rules and standards
of the profession and "exercise these privileges given" with caution
and responsibility. 7' In Kentucky, for instance, even some legal interns
165 Blake, supra note i6, at 647.
166 Kafker, supra note 8, at 39.
167 Id. at 39.
168 Id.; seealso Odess v. Taylor, 211 So.2d 805, 811 (Ala. 1968).
169 See Berg, supra note 70, at 31.
170 Id. at 31-32 (citing Ralph B. Freidin & Alan M. Lazerson, Terminating the Physician-
Patient Relationship in Primary Care, 241 JAMA 819, 8zz (1979) ("The physician-patient rela-
tionship is central to the process of primary care.").
171 Ky. Sup. CT. R. 2.540; Oath of Legal Intern Under Student Practice Rule, available
at http://www.kybar.org/documents/scr/scr2/scr_2.54o.pdf. Section 228 of the Kentucky
Constitution provides that:
Members of the General Assembly and all officers, before they en-
ter upon the execution of the duties of their respective offices, and all
members of the bar, before they enter upon the practice of their profes-
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"solemnly swear" that they will "support and defend the Constitution of
the United States" and "neither take part in deception of the court, nor
allow deception to take place."'' 12 This vow is later renewed to the bar
and to the state.7 3 It is a pledge to "faithfully execute," to the best of
their ability, the office "according to law" and a promise to carry out each
challenge without any offense." 4
In the study and practice of medicine, the Hippocratic Oath dates back
to the fourth century BC 5 For centuries thereafter, young doctors have
entered this "covenant... according to the medical law." 17 6 The words of the
original oath state that to fulfill and uphold it is to "enjoy life and art, being
honored with fame among all men for all time to come."'77 Those taking
the modern oath promise to "respect the hard-won scientific gains of those
physicians in whose steps [they] walk, and gladly share such knowledge.
. with those who are to follow."'78 Moreover, every new physician states
his or her understanding that "warmth, sympathy, and understanding may
sion, shall take the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear
(or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and be
faithful and true to the Commonwealth of Kentucky so long as I con-
tinue a citizen thereof, and that I will faithfully execute, to the best of
my ability, the office of [insert office here] according to law; and I do
further solemnly swear (or affirm) that since the adoption of the present
Constitution, I, being a citizen of this State, have not fought a duel with
deadly weapons within this State nor out of it, nor have I sent or ac-
cepted a challenge to fight a duel with deadly weapons, nor have I acted
as second in carrying a challenge, nor aided or assisted any person thus
offending, so help me God.
KY. CONST. § 228. Comparewith LUDWIG EDELSTEIN,'THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, T NSLATION,
AND INTERPRETATION 55 (Johns Hopkins Press, 1943).
172 Id.
173 See Ky. Sup. CT. R. 2.540; see also Ky. CONST. § 228.
174 Ky. CONST. § 228.
175 EDELSTEIN, supra note 171 AT 55; see also OATH OF HIPPOCRATES, SOUTHERN CROSS
BIoETHIcS INSTITUTE, http://www.bioethics.org.au/Resources.html (follow "Codes of Ethics"
hyperlink; then follow "Oath of Hippocrates - Greece 4th Century BC" hyperlink) (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2oo9); HIPPOCRATIC OATH, INDIANA UNIVERSITY, http://www.indiana.edu/-ancmed/
oath.htm. (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
176 EDELSTEIN, supra note 175, at 3.
177 Id.
178 Louis LASAGNA, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: MODERN VERSION, NOVA - DOCTOR'S DIARIES
- "IHE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: MODERN VERSION - PBS, http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/nova/doctors/
oath_modern.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter LASAGNA - MODERN VERSION] (Louis
Lasagna is the Academic Dean of the School of Medicine at Tufts University and his modern
version of the Hippocratic Oath is used in many medical schools today); see also A MODERN
VERSION OF THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medterms.comlscriptl
main/art.asp?articlekey=2o9o9 (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter MODERN VERSION].
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outweigh the surgeon's knife or the chemist's drug."'79
Furthermore, every new doctor pledges to "call in [his] colleagues when
the skills of another are needed for a patient's recovery."'' 8 Every physician
makes a promise to "respect the privacy of [his] patients, for their problems
are not disclosed ... that the world may know."'' Aside from caring for the
sick, every physician takes on a greater responsibility, one which may force
him or her to "tread with care in matters of life and death" and stand by
the loved ones of those who are dying. 8 ' Those who choose to enter this
profession take on "special obligations to all ... fellow human beings, those
sound of mind and body as well as the infirm."'183 Thus, to allow restrictions
on the practice of those who willingly make this promise to every member
of our society is not only contrary to public policy, but to the covenant made
by every physician in this country.
CONCLUSION
Given the parallels in the public policy arguments and the considerations
that must be taken into account when evaluating restrictive covenants in
the legal and medical professions, it becomes difficult to understand what
causes such disparate results in the application of such covenants. When
dealing with noncompete agreements between professionals who in the
course of their employment not only do, but purposefully seek to, develop
intimately close relationships, it seems nonsensical to disallow restrictive
covenants in one field and not the other. When the primary distinctive
feature of the professional relationship reaches or has the potential to reach
both the client and the employee on a deeply personal level, the grounds
upon which a restrictive covenant may be upheld become shaky.
Moreover, it seems odd that while the landscape of restrictive covenants
is changing to allow for greater employee mobility, freedom of movement,
and more competition, the view of the majority of courts toward enforcement
of restrictive covenants among physicians has not changed. As noted, while
some courts have slowly begun to step in the right direction by drawing upon
principles and the rationale for holding noncompete agreements unethical
in the legal profession, the majority have not yet taken this necessary
step. Most courts still treat restrictive covenants among physicians just
as restrictive covenants in the commercial setting. Notwithstanding the
influence of the AMA on some courts, most still value the interests of the
employer over those of the physician employee, and as a result, over those
of the patient.
179 LASAGNA - MODERN VERSION, supra note 178; MODERN VERSION, supra note 178.
8o LASAGNA - MODERN VERSION, supra note 178; MODERN VERSION, supra note 178.
18 1 LASAGNA - MODERN VERSION, supra note 178; MODERN VERSION, supra note 178.
182 LASAGNA - MODERN VERSION, supra note 178; MODERN VERSION, supra note 178.
183 LASAGNA - MODERN VERSION, supra note 178; MODERN VERSION, supra note 178.
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On the other hand, restrictive covenants among attorneys are still
considered unethical in all jurisdictions. Courts still emphasize the client's
freedom of choice and the lawyer's duty as a fiduciary as the underlying
public policy rationale for holding those covenants unethical. The lawyer's
duty remains primarily to the client, and courts still gladly value that policy
over protecting the interests of the employer.
Noncompete contracts in medicine must be subject to special scrutiny,
given that the relationship affects not only the employer and the employee,
but has a direct bearing on the well-being of a third party - the patient.
Restrictive covenants between physicians should be construed in favor of
employee mobility, focusing on "access to medical care and facilities."
184
It is ludicrous to advocate against this position in order to prevent
competition between physicians. Instead of examining each restrictive
covenant between a doctor and a prior employer under the standard of
reasonableness, courts should turn to the rule of ethics adopted in the
legal profession. The direct parallels in the honor and nature of these two
unique professions, and the public considerations they entail must be used
to create a directive that reads against covenants not to compete. In turn,
a rule that favors freedom of choice by the patient, freedom of movement
for the former employee, and competition that will provide better medical
services to individuals and communities alike.
When looking at a noncompete agreement, courts must evaluate
restrictive covenants between physicians in a similar manner as lawyers'
noncompetes. The nature of the profession and the concerns of public
policy must be seen as controlling against the considerations of what has
previously been viewed as the legitimate business purpose of the employer.
Ultimately, when restrictive covenants are upheld among physicians, the
patients take the hardest hit. The best way to deal with this injustice is
to carve out an exception for the medical profession, just as one has been
created for those practicing law. In judging noncompetes, clients' interests
- exactly that upon which the ethics of the profession are centered - must
prevail over all other considerations. To continue allowing restrictive
covenants to be enforced in medicine is simply to treat the sick with bad
medicine.185
184 Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
185 See Mike J. Wyatt, Comment, Buy Out or Get Out: Why Covenants Not to Compete in
Surgeon Employment Contracts are Truly Bad Medicine, 45 WASHBuRN L.J. 715 (2006).
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